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OREGON'S DEVELOPMENT OF ABSOLUTE
LIABILITY UNDER THE RYLANDS DOCTRINE:
A CASE STUDY
C. CONRAD CLAUS*
"Unstable as water, thou shalt not excel ......
I. INTRODUCTION
Water has always been a double-edged sword for humanity. It is a
necessity for a multitude of human activities, and much of
civilization rests upon the successful use and development of water
resources.2 Yet "[c]ivilization represents a state of. . . hazard with
respect to water,"3 for "'[w]ater, at times, is a most dangerous
element even flowing in its natural condition, without the influence
of man; and, when formally restrained by the works of man ... it
becomes even more dangerous."'4 Perhaps nowhere are the potential
* B.S. 1992, Portland State University; J.D. 1996, Willamette University College of
Law.
1. Genesis 49:4 (King James).
2. See generally JOHN P. POWELSON, THE STORY OF LAND: A WORLD HISTORY OF
LAND TENURE AND AGRARIAN REFORM (1988). In fact, some historians have suggested that
human civilization and organized govemment developed because of the requirements of
organizing and managing large water control projects. See generally id.
3. Paul B. Sears, Introduction to ELMER T. PETERSON, BIG DAM FOOLISHNESS at vii
(1954).
4. Suko v. Northwestern lce & Cold Storage Co., 113 P.2d 209, 212 (Or. 1941) (quoting
3 CLESSON S. KINNEY, A TREATISE ON THE LAW OF IRRIGATION § 1669, at 3069-70 (1912)).
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dangers of restrained waters greater than in the construction and
maintenance of reservoirs. A striking example of these dangers is the
failure of the reservoir above Johnstown, Pennsylvania in 1889. In
the late 1880s, a club of wealthy sportsmen built a private hunting
and fishing reservoir near the center of Johnstown by placing a dam
across South Fork Creek, a small tributary of the Little Conemaugh
River. Although the inhabitants of Johnstown initially expressed
concern over the safety of the dam, the club allayed such concern by
engaging the services of a competent engineer who declared that the
dam was thoroughly sound.6
On May 31, 1889, heavy mountain rains significantly increased
the water level of the reservoir, which, over the course of ten years,
had become a considerably large lake.7 The resulting increase in
water pressure caused the dam to collapse, releasing the reservoir's
water into the town below.8 The consequences were horrific; the
deluge killed approximately two thousand people9 and caused $17
million in property damage. '
For centuries, mankind has enacted laws to deal with the dangers
of restrained waters." Such laws have been especially significant in
Oregon because, in the words of former Oregon State Representative
Parkinson, "Oregon is a wet state.' 2 In 1979, a statewide study of
5. See WILLIS FLETCHER JOHNSON, HISTORY OF THE JOHNSTOWN FLOOD 15, 32-33
(1889).
6. See id. at 33-34.
7. See DAVID G. MCCULLOUGH, THE JOHNSTOWN FLOOD 100 (1968).
8. See id
9. See DISASTER, DISASTER, DISASTER: CATASTROPHES WHICH CHANGED LAWS 36
(Dougless Newton ed., 1961).
10. See MCCULLOUGH, supra note 7, at 264. For the purposes of this Article, it is
instructive that, though there were several suits filed against the owners of the club, none of the
plaintiffs prevailed. See id. at 258. Pennsylvania had only the three traditional common law
bases of liability, each of which precluded recovery by the plaintiffs in their suits. See CHAPIN
D. CLARK, SURVEY OF OREGON'S WATER LAWS 66 (1974); see also discussion infra notes 28-
34 and accompanying text.
11. For example, in the Code of Hammurabi, one of the earliest sets of written laws, the
Babylonians attempted to deal with disputes that arose when efforts to control large amounts of
water went awry. See THE HAMMURABI CODE 37 (Chilperic Edwards ed., 1971). For an
example of another pre-modern society's problems with water impoundment projects and the
legal actions resulting from those problems, see JEAN GIMPEL, THE MEDIEVAL MACHINE 17-21
(1980).
12. Hearings Before the House Committee on Intergovernmental Affairs in Regards to SB
97, 49th Legis., Reg. Sess. (Or. 1957) (audio tape HC-85-IGA-156 available in the Oregon
https://openscholarship.wustl.edu/law_urbanlaw/vol53/iss1/5
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Oregon found over five thousand existing or proposed reservoirs that
were large enough to be considered for use as hydroelectric power
sources.' While most of these structures are not as large as the
Johnstown Reservoir was, they, as well as smaller agricultural
reservoirs,14 restrain massive and potentially damaging forces that
pose significant danger to their surrounding areas. Oregon's general
approach to legal disputes arising from the failure of such dams and
reservoirs is to impose heightened liability on the owners of these
bodies of water. Oregon courts have followed a fairly consistent path
in treating this issue,1 5 from their earliest decisions that addressed the
issue to their most recent decisions.
This Article will trace the development of absolute liability' 6 for
the escape of impounded waters, often called the Rylands doctrine,
17
from its genesis, over 130 years ago, to the present. Part II of this
Article outlines the origin of the Rylands doctrine. Part III gives an
overview of the different ways in which states in this country have
adopted and implemented the Rylands doctrine. Part IV then
discusses Oregon's application of the Rylands doctrine. Finally, Part
V concludes that Oregon's application of the Rylands doctrine serves
as a tested model of absolute liability for the release of artificially
impounded waters.
II. THE BIRTH OF THE RYLANDS DOCTRINE
Absolute liability for the escape of impounded waters was first
established in England during the mid-nineteenth century in the case
State Legislative Archives). Representative Parkinson made this statement while speaking about
proposed changes to the state rules for municipal annexation of property across bodies of water
and the possible abuses of those rules. See id.
13. See PETER C. KLINGEMAN, A RESOURCE SURVEY OF THE HYDROELECTRIC
POTENTIAL AT EXISTING AND PROPOSED DAMS IN OREGON 85 (1980).
14. Based on a study of small agricultural reservoirs in Oklahoma, which indicated that
there were approximately forty-five thousand small agricultural reservoirs in that state in 1953,
it is probably safe to assume that there are at least that many reservoirs in Oregon, where water
resources are more plentiful. See ELMER T. PETERSON, BIG DAM FOOLISHNESS 192 (1954).
15. But see William L. Hallmark, Recent Case, Irrigation Districts and Rylands v.
Fletcher in Oregon, 46 OR. L. REV. 239 (1967) (suggesting that Oregon Supreme Court
decisions in this area of the law are somewhat contradictory).
16. For a brief discussion of the term "absolute liability," see infra note 49.
17. See infra Part 11.
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of Fletcher v. Rylands.18
A. The Factual Setting
In 1850, Fletcher obtained the right to work the Red House
Colliery, located in the Township of Ainsworth.19 To the west of the
Red House Colliery, separated from the Colliery by a single
intervening piece of property, was the Ainsworth Mill, owned by
Rylands.20 In 1851, Fletcher additionally obtained the right to mine
the coal from the land that intervened between the Ainsworth Mill
and the Red House Colliery.2' Between 1851 and 1860, Fletcher
removed the coal from an underground seam that extended to the
border of Rylands's property.")
In 1860, Rylands began constructing a reservoir to supply the
Ainsworth Mill with water.23 During the construction of the reservoir
bed, Rylands discovered five old vertical coal-mining shafts.24 The
timber sides of the shafts remained, but the shafts themselves were
filled with soil.25 When Rylands filled the reservoir, water burst
through the soil in one of the vertical mine shafts and entered the
abandoned underground coal workings beneath Rylands's property.
The water then entered the coal workings on Fletcher's intervening
property and flowed into the Red House Colliery, causing it to be
permanently abandoned as a working mine.26
B. The Court of Exchequer Opinion
Fletcher subsequently brought a recovery action against Rylands
18. 3 H. & C. 774, 159 Eng. Rep. 737 (Ex. 1865), rev'd, 1 L.R.-Ex. 265 (Ex. Ch. 1866),
aff'd, 3 L.R.-E. & I. App. 330 (H.L. 1868).




23. See id. at 739.
24. See id
25. See idl at 740. The shafts were the remains of forgotten coal workings that were
located beneath Rylands's property and that had been "worked at some time or other beyond
living memory." Id. at 739.
26. See id at 740.
https://openscholarship.wustl.edu/law_urbanlaw/vol53/iss1/5
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in the Court of Exchequer.27 Under the common law, recovery was
possible on one of three grounds: trespass, negligence, or nuisance.28
A party could be liable under trespass only for damages caused by
immediate encroachments. 29 In this case, the water did not directly
trespass onto Fletcher's property, but, rather, crossed another
property first. The court found that this encroachment was merely
"mediate or consequential" 30 and, thus, denied recovery for trespass. 31
Furthermore, the court determined that the construction of a below-
ground pond was a "nuisance to no one"32 and, therefore, denied
recovery for nuisance.33 Finally, the court denied recovery for
negligence after finding that Rylands had acted with due care with
respect to Fletcher's property. 4 Thus, the court found for the
defendant, Rylands.35
C. The Exchequer Chamber Opinion
While not disputing the Court of Exchequer's analysis of the three
traditional bases for recovery, the Exchequer Chamber reversed the
decision of the trial court and found for the plaintiff, Fletcher.36 The
court, in an opinion written by Justice Blackburn, found that:
[T]he person who for his own purposes brings on his lands and
collects and keeps there anything likely to do mischief if it
escapes, must keep it in at his peril, and, if he does not do so, is
prima facie answerable for all the damage which is the natural
27. See id. at 737.
28. See id at 744.





34. See id. at 744, 747. In his dissent, Baron Bramwell argued that Fletcher ought to be
able to recover from Rylands regardless of the applicability of the three traditional bases for
recovery. Bramwell argued that "on the plain ground that the defendants have caused water to
flow into the plaintiff's mines, which but for their, the defendants', act would not have gone
there, this action is maintainable." Id. at 744 (Bramwell, B., dissenting). Bramwell's opinion
thus presaged the Exchequer Chamber's Rylands holding. See infra Part lI.C.
35. Seeid. at747.
36. See 1 L.R.-Ex. at 269.
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consequence of its escape.37
This passage of Blackburn's opinion established broad liability for
land owners whose land development activities result in the
unexpected release of a large volume of water. However, Justice
Blackburn limited this principle later in his opinion by requiring that
a defendant have introduced onto his property a substance that is
foreign to his property:
[I]t seems but reasonable and just that the neighbour, who has
brought something on his own property which is not naturally
there, harmless to others so long as it is confined to his own
property, but which he knows to be mischievous if it gets on
his neighbour's, should be obliged to make good the damage
which ensues if he does not succeed in confining it to his own
property."
In Rylands, the "something" not "naturally there" was the water in
the mill pond, an artificial construction of the defendant.
39
During oral arguments, Justice Blackburn referred to Smith v.
Kenrick40 and Baird v. Williamson,4' two cases involving water that
left a defendant's property and entered a neighboring mine shaft. In
Smith, the defendant allowed water that had naturally entered his
mine to enter the plaintiff's mine through underground conduits that
ran between the two mines.42 The Smith court found for the defendant
because the defendant's use of the mine was not "unusual, ' ' 3 and the
water in the defendant's mine had "naturally flow[ed] down"44 to the
plaintiff's mine.
45
In contrast, Baird, which the Court of Common Pleas decided
after the Court of Exchequer decided Rylands, involved several
defendants who permitted water to be pumped directly into the
37. I at 279.
38. Id. at 280 (emphasis added).
39. See id.
40. 137 Eng. Rep. 205 (C.P. 1849).
41. 143 Eng. Rep. 831 (C.P. 1863).
42. See 137 Eng. Rep. at 206-07.
43. Id. at 223.
44. Id. at 225.
45. See idL at 224-25.
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plaintiff's mine as part of the defendants' mineral extraction
operations.46 The Baird court held that the defendants were liable for
the incursion because the flow of water to the plaintiff's mine was
contrary to the "operation of nature."47 Blackburn declared that Baird
and Smith established the proposition that "the mine owner who
works to the edge of his land subjects himself to the natural flow of
water into his mine, but not to the flow of water artificially brought
there by a neighboring mine-owner."48 Justice Blackburn's emphasis
on the importance of questioning whether water causing damage to
neighboring land was "naturally there" seems to acknowledge (and
perhaps extend) the importance of the principles that he extracted
from Smith and Baird.
D. The House ofLords Opinion
After the Exchequer Chamber determined that Rylands was
absolutely liable49 for the escape of water from his mill pond into
Fletcher's mine, Rylands appealed to the House of Lords.50 Affirming
the Exchequer Chamber's opinion,51 the Chancellor, Lord Cairnes,
concurred with Justice Blackburn's opinion and farther refined the
rule of law applicable to the escape of impounded waters.52 Lord
Cairnes relied on Blackburn's "naturally there" language and the
principles that Blackburn extracted from Smith and Baird.53
46. See 143 Eng. Rep. at 832.
47. Id. at 837.
48. Fletcher v. Rylands, 1 L.R.-Ex. 265,270 (Ex. Ch. 1866).
49. "Absolute liability" is the modem term for the type of liability that the Exchequer
Chamber imposed on Rylands. Courts and commentators frequently refer to this type of liability
as "strict liability." See Thomas C. Galligan, Strict Liability in Action: The Truncated Learned
Hand Formula, 52 LA. L. REV. 325 (1991). Some authorities, however, believe that the term
"strict liability" more properly applies to cases involving a case-specific risk-utility balance not
called for in Rylands. See id. at 336. Thus, for the purposes of this Article, and with due respect
for the courts and commentators that have used the term "strict liability," this author adopts the
"absolute liability" wording as more conceptually useful.
50. See Rylands v. Fletcher, 3 L.R.-E. & I. App. 330 (H.L. 1868).
51. See id. at 342.
52. See id. at 337-40.
53. See id. at 338-39. Using Blackbum's "naturally there" language and the holdings of
both Smith v. Kenrick and Baird v. Williamson, Lord Caimes wrote:
The Defendants... might lawfully have used [their] close for any purpose for which it
might in the ordinary course of the enjoyment of land be used; and if, in what I may
Washington University Open Scholarship
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Significantly, Lord Cairnes clarified Justice Blackburn's "naturally
there" language by requiring that the activity causing the damage
involve a "non-natural" use of the land.-4 In other words, to be the
sort of activity for which absolute liability could be imposed, Lord
Cairnes required that an activity be "likely to do mischief' and not be
of the type that would occur "in the ordinary course of the enjoyment
of the land."5'
Rylands established a new basis of liability for property damage,
the gravamen of which lies in the nature of certain activities that are
carried out on real property. Some of these activities, such as forcing
water onto a neighbor's property, or harboring a large volume of
water, can carry a high risk of harm to innocent neighbors. While
term the natural use of that land, there had been any accumulation of water, either on
the surface or underground, and if, by the operation of the laws of nature, that
accumulation of water had passed off into the close occupied by the Plaintiff, the
Plaintiff could not have complained that that result had taken place....
On the other hand if the Defendants, not stopping at the natural use of their close,
had desired to use it for any purpose which I may term a non-natural use, for the
purpose of introducing into the close that which in its natural condition was not in or
upon it, for the purpose of introducing water either above or below ground in
quantities and in a manner not the result of any work or operation on or under the
land,-and if in consequence of their doing so, or in consequence of any imperfection
in the mode of their doing so, the water came to escape and to pass off into the close of
the Plaintiff, then it appears to me that that which the Defendants were doing they
were doing at their own peril; and, if in the course of their doing it, the evil arose to
which I have referred, the evil, namely, of the escape of the water and its passing away
to the close of the Plaintiff and injuring the Plaintiff, then for the consequence of that,
in my opinion, the Defendants would be liable.
Id.
54. See id. Some commentators seem to ignore the close connection between the
"naturally there" wording in Blackburn's opinion and the "non-natural" requirement of Lord
Caimes's opinion. See, e.g., CLARK, supra note 10, at 66; Thomas B. Brand, Rylands v.
Fletcher in Oregon, 1 WILLAMLrTE L. REv. 344, 344-45 (1960); J.3. Glen, Annotation,
Liability for Overflow or Escape of Waterfrom Reservoir, Ditch, or Artificial Pond, 169 A.L.R.
517, 520 (1957). This treatment may be attributable to William L. Prosser's treatment of
Rylands, which ignores the connection and credits Justice Blackburn with creating the broad
statement of law that "the person who brings on his land and collects and keeps there anything
likely to do mischief if it escapes, must keep it at his peril...." WILLIAM L. PROSSER,
HANDBOOK OF THE LAW OF TORTS § 59, at 449 (1941). Prosser treats Lord Caimes's "non-
natural" use requirement as an "important qualification" that limited the scope of Blackburn's
opinion. See id.
55. Rylands v. Fletcher, 3 L.R.-E. & I. App. 330,338-39 (H.L. 1868).
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such activities may produce a net public good and, thus, are not
considered a public nuisance, it is unfair to require unsuspecting
neighbors to bear the damage that these activities might cause, even
when the party conducting the dangerous activity is innocent of any
negligent behavior. The Rylands doctrine imposes a policy, therefore,
that between two parties innocent of any wrongdoing, the party
responsible for a dangerous activity must pay the cost of any damage
that the activity produces. This, in effect, makes the party conducting
such a dangerous activity an insurer for neighbors who might be
damaged by the activity.
III. ACCEPTANCE OF THE RYLANDS DOCTRINE IN THE UNITED STATES
Whether a particular state has adopted a limited, categorical
reading of the Rylands doctrine 6 or a broader, general reading,57 it
can be said that "most jurisdictions in this country have adopted the
principle of Rylands v. Fletcher ... and impose liability on owners
and users of land for harm resulting from abnormally dangerous
conditions and activities .... ,,58
A. The General Rule
American courts began dealing with Rylands absolute liability
soon after the House of Lords issued its Rylands opinion. The first
American jurisdiction to apply the Rylands doctrine was
Massachusetts, where a court imposed absolute liability on a
defendant who allowed filthy water to percolate into a neighbor's
well.59 Shortly thereafter, Minnesota adopted Rylands absolute
liability in a case involving the breach of an underground water
tunnel.6° For several decades following these decisions, courts and
56. See, e.g., Shockley v. Hoechst Celanese Corp., 793 F. Supp. 670 (D.S.C. 1992).
57. See. e.g., Peneschi v. National Steel Corp., 295 S.E.2d 1, 5 (W. Va. 1982) ("The 'rule'
of Rylands is that 'the defendant will be liable when he damages another by a thing or activity
unduly dangerous and inappropriate to the place where it is maintained, in light of the character
of that place and its surroundings."' (quoting W. PAGE KEETON E7 AL., PROSSER AND KEETON
ON THE LAW OF TORTS § 78, at 508 (4th ed. 1970))).
58. Ruggeri v. Minnesota Mining & Mfg. Co., 380 N.E.2d 445,447 (111. App. Ct. 1978).
59. See Ball v. Nye, 99 Mass. 582 (1868).
60. See Cahill v. Eastman, 18 Minn. 324 (1872).
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commentators in the United States largely disapproved of the Rylands
doctrine.61
Some commentators have suggested that Rylands initially met
nearly uniform resistance throughout the United States due to the
country's rapid expansion and socioeconomic development during
the nineteenth century.62 During this period, the United States
government was trying to encourage economic growth in its frontier
regions. A doctrine such as Rylands would have treated harshly those
who were constructing the American infrastructure. Thus, Rylands
was unacceptable at the time.63 Once the American infrastructure
61. See KEETON ETAL., supra note 57, § 78, at 508 (citing Brown v. Collins, 53 N.H. 442
(1873)); see also Marshall v. Welwood, 38 N.J.L. 339 (1876); Losee v. Buchanan, 51 N.Y. 476
(1873); Jeremiah Smith, Tort and Absolute Liability, 30 HARv. L. REv. 241, 319, 408 (1916);
Ezra Ripley Thayer, Liability Without Fault, 29 HARV. L. REV. 801 (1916); The Theory of
Torts, 7 AM. L. REV. 652 (1873); cf. Frederick Pollock, Duties ofInsuring Safety: The Rule in
Rylands v. Fletcher, 2 L. Q. REV. 52 (1886) (comparing the lack of acceptance of the Rylands
doctrine in the United States and the doubts over its historical significance in England). But see
Braford Glycerine Co. v. St. Mary's Woolen Mfg. Co., 54 N.E. 528 (Ohio 1899) (applying
Rylands liability to an explosion of stored nitroglycerine); Weaver Mercantile Co. v. Thurmond,
70 S.E. 126 (W. Va. 1911) (applying Rylands to the escape of impounded water).
The Pennsylvania Supreme Court, in an opinion delivered nearly twenty years after Rylands
was decided, exemplified the general disapproval of the doctrine in the United States:
The doctrine declared in Fletcher v. Rylands, regarded as a general statement of the
law, is perhaps not open to criticism in England, but it is subject to many and obvious
exceptions there, and has not been generally received in this country. A rule which
casts upon an innocent person the responsibility of an insurer is a hard one at the best,
and will not be generally applied unless required by some public policy or the contract
of the parties.
Pennsylvania Coal Co. v. Sanderson, 6 A. 453, 460 (Pa. 1886). Later in the case the court
continued:
In the first place, then, we do not regard the rule in Rylands v. Fletcher as having
any application to a case of this kind; and, if it had, we are unwilling to recognize the
arbitrary and absolute rule of responsibility it declares, to the full extent, at least, to
which its general statement would necessarily lead.
Id. at 463.
62. See W. PAGE KEETON ET AL., PROSSER AND KEETON ON THE LAW OF TORTS § 78, at
549 (5th ed. 1984).
63. See, e.g., Dye v. Burdick, 553 S.W.2d 833, 840 (Ark. 1977) ("One reason often given
for the rejection of strict liability is the burden that would be placed upon a legitimate activity
which is in the interest of utilization and development of natural resources and the state's
economy, such as the advancement of agriculture." (citing Barum v. Handschiegel, 173 N.W,
593 (Neb. 1919))); cf Turner v. Big Lake Oil Co., 96 S.W.2d 221, 223 (Tex. 1936) ("The fact
that [Rylands], as abstractly stated, cannot be justly applied to all subjects which its terms
embrace, is enough to show that it is incorrect as a statement of a general principle of law.
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became more developed, however, a number of jurisdictions found
absolute liability more palatable. 64
Currently, most states generally accept the Rylands doctrine either
by name or by a statement of law that was derived from Rylands 5
As of 1984, Rylands was rejected by name in only seven American
jurisdictions:6 Maine,67 New Hampshire,68 New York,69 Oklahoma,70
Rhode Island,71 Texas,72 and, for all practical purposes, Wyoming.
73
Accordingly, it has not met with general acceptance in this country.").
64. For a discussion of this trend, see KEETON ET AL., supra note 62, § 78, at 548-49.
65. See id. at 549 ("[Rylands] has been approved by name, or a statement of principle
clearly derived from it has been accepted, in some thirty jurisdictions, with the number
expanding at the rate of about one a year.") (citing Enos Coal Mining Co. v. Schuchart, 188
N.E.2d 406 (Ind. 1962); Healey v. Citizens Gas & Elec. Co., 201 N.W. 118 (Iowa 1924);
Central Exploration Co. v. Gray, 70 So.2d 33 (Miss. 1954); Berg v. Reaction Motors Div.,
Thiokol Chem. Corp., 181 A.2d 487 (N.J. 1962); Thigpen v. Skousen & Hise, 327 P.2d 802
(N.M. 1958); Loe v. Lenhardt, 362 P.2d 312 (Or. 1961); Wallace v. A.H. Guion & Co., 117
S.E.2d 359 (S.C. 1960)); see also Zampos v. United States Smelting, Refining and Mining Co.,
206 F.2d 171 (10th Cir. 1953); Cross Oil Co. v. Phillips Petroleum Co., 944 F. Supp 787 (E.D.
Mo. 1996); In re Tutu Wells Contamination Litig., 846 F.Supp. 1243 (D.V.I. 1993); Sterling v.
Velsicol Chem. Corp., 647 F. Supp. 303 (W.D. Tenn. 1986); Gainey v. Folkman, 114 F. Supp.
231 (D. Ariz. 1953); Matomeo Oil Co. v. Arctic Mechanical, Inc., 796 P.2d 1336 (Alaska
1990); North Little Rock Transp. Co. v. Finkbeiner, 420 S.W.2d 874 (Ark. 1967); Luthringer v.
Moore, 190 P.2d I (Cal. 1948); Catholic Welfare Guild, Inc. v. Brodney Corp., 208 A.2d 301
(Del. Super. Ct. 1964); Cities Service Co. v. State, 312 So.2d 799 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 2d 1975);
Fallon v. Indian Trail Sch., 500 N.E.2d 101 (Ill. App. Ct. 1986); National Steel Serv. Ctr., Inc.
v. Gibbons, 319 N.W.2d 269 (Iowa 1982); Williams v. Amoco Prod. Co., 734 P.2d 1113 (Kan.
1987); Washington Suburban Sanitary Comm'n v. CAE-Link Corp., 622 A.2d 745 (Md. 1993),
cert. denied, 510 U.S. 907 (1993); Clark-Aiken Co. v. Cromwell-Wright Co. Inc., 323 N.E.2d
876 (Mass. 1975); Valentine v. Pioneer Chlor Alkali Co., 864 P.2d 295 (Nev. 1993); Guilford
Realty and Ins. Co. v. Blyth Bros. Co., 131 S.E.2d 900 (N.C. 1963); Phillip Morris, Inc. v.
Emerson, 368 S.E.2d 268 (Va. 1988); Siegler v. Kuhlman, 502 P.2d 1181 (Wash. 1972), cert.
denied, 411 U.S. 983 (1973).
66. See KEETON ET AL., supra note 62, § 78, at 549; cf Rodney Max, Blasting-An
Abnormally Dangerous Activity in Need ofa Strict Liability Standard, 11 CUMB. L. REV. 23, 25
(1980) ("The majority of states now recognize blasting as an abnormally dangerous activity and
apply the strict liability approach for injury or damage caused thereby.").
67. See KEETON ST AL., supra note 62, § 78, at 549 n.57 (citing Reynolds v. W.H.
Hinman Co., 75 A.2d 802 (Me. 1950)). But see Hanlin Group v. Int'l Minerals & Chem. Corp.,
759 F. Supp. 925 (D. Me. 1990).
68. See Garland v. Towne, 55 N.H. 55 (1874); see also KEETON ET AL., supra note 62,
§ 78, at 549 n.58 (citing Brown v. Collins, 53 N.H. 442 (1873)).
69. See KEETON ET AL., supra note 62, § 78, at 549 n.59 (citing Losee v. Buchanan, 51
N.Y. 476 (1873); Cosulich v. Standard Oil Co., 25 N.E. 259 (1890)).
70. See Sinclair Prairie Oil Co. v. Stell, 124 P.2d 255 (Okla. 1942); see also KEETON ET
AL., supra note 62, § 78, at 549 n.60 (citing Gulf Pipe Line Co. v. Sims, 32 P.2d 902 (Okla.
1934)).
71. See KEETON ET AL., supra note 62, § 78, at 549 n.61 (citing Rose v. Socony-Vacuum
Washington University Open Scholarship
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However, even in these jurisdictions, it is likely that the principle of
Rylands has been accepted, and absolute liability imposed, under the
name of "nuisance" or "absolute nuisance." 74
Corp., 173 A. 627 (RLI. 1934)); see also Wilson Auto Enters., Inc. v. Mobil Oil Corp., 778 F.
Supp. 101 (D.1RI. 1991).
72. See KEETON Er AL., supra note 62, § 78, at 549 n.62 (citing Turner v. Big Lake Oil
Co., 96 S.W.2d 221 (Tex. 1936)); Gulf, Colo. & Santa Fe RLR. Co. v. Oakes, 58 S.W. 999 (Tex.
1900); see also Stephens Trucking Co. v. Kemp, 560 S.W.2d 523 (Tex. Civ. App. 1977, no
writ); Dellinger v. Skelly Oil Co., 236 S.W.2d 675 (Tex. Civ. App. 1951, writ ref'd n.r.e.).
73. See KEETON ET AL., supra note 62, § 78, at 549 (citing Jacoby v. Gillette, 174 P.2d
505 (Wyo. 1947)). While the possibility that a Wyoming court might impose Rylands absolute
liability may not yet be foreclosed, its likelihood has grown more remote since 1984. In
Wyrulec Co. v. Schutt, 866 P.2d 756,761 (Wyo. 1993), the Wyoming Supreme Court stated:
Wyoming, as had most states, rejected the notion that absolute liability should be
imposed for anything brought onto the land which was not naturally there, escaped and
caused damage. This court required that negligence must be shown. We have since
consistently imposed the standard of ordinary care under all of the circumstances
rather than absolute liability.
Id. (citation omitted).
74. See KEETON ET AL., supra note 62, § 78, at 552-53 ("There is in fact probably no case
applying Rylands v. Fletcher which is not duplicated in all essential respects by some American
decision which proceeds on the theory of nuisance; and it is quite evident that under that name
the principle is in reality universally accepted." (footnote omitted)); see also William L.
Prosser, Nuisance Without Fault, 20 TEX. L. REV. 399, 426 (1942) ("[L]iability for what is
called 'nuisance' very often rests upon a basis of strict liability, without proof of wrongful
intent or negligence, and is not to be distinguished in any respect from the doctrine of Rylands
v. Fletcher.").
While for some time several American jurisdictions classified Rylands as a nuisance
doctrine, this view is no longer widely followed. See, e.g., The Ingrid, 195 F. 596 (S.D.N.Y.
1912); In re Oskar Tiedman and Co., 179 F. Supp. 227 (D. Del. 1959); Brownsey v. General
Printing Ink Corp., 193 A. 824 (N.J. 1937); Taylor v. Cincinnati, 55 N.E.2d 724 (Ohio 1924).
Perhaps the best statement of the current legal thought on this issue was made by the Third
Circuit Court of Appeals in Moran v. Pittsburgh-Des Moines Steel Co.:
There is a well recognized doctrine in the law which found a full exposition in the
famous English case of Rylands v. Fletcher which imposes liability on a land occupier
who collects on his premises things which are apt to do harm if they escape. The law
imposes insurer's liability, or almost insurer's liability, upon the occupier in such case
for the harm done to his neighbors for the escape of the dangerous substance. The rule
and its limitations are well recognized and generally classified today under the heading
of ultra-hazardous activities, or some such descriptive phrase....
Sometimes courts, clear as to the result to be reached, but not always happy in the
words used to describe it, have talked the law of nuisance in this connection .... But
the basis for liability is not really nuisance, a wrong in itself for which equitable relief
against continuance would be appropriate. The basis of liability, instead, is the
conclusion that when a man does something extraordinarily dangerous which creates
an unusual risk to his neighbors he should bear the consequences when that risk ripens
into harm.... [This is] the now orthodox explanation of the basis of liability ....
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While most, if not all, American jurisdictions have endorsed some
form of Rylands absolute liability, many of the jurisdictions employ
distinct liability analyses. For example, some jurisdictions rely solely
on Rylands, and subsequent case law interpreting Rylands, as their
basis for finding absolute liability.75 Other jurisdictions rely upon the
Restatement of Torts (First)7 6 as their basis for absolute liability.77
The majority of jurisdictions that recognize Rylands absolute
liability, however, rely on the Restatement of Torts (Second),7 often
identified as the embodiment of Fletcher v. Rylands.7 9 The
166 F.2d 908, 912-13 (3rd Cir. 1948) (footnote omitted); see also Kall v. Carruthers, 211 P. 43,
44 (Cal. 1922). In Kall, the California Supreme Court stated:
In Fletcher v. Rylands it was declared that no amount of diligence is a legal excuse if
[impounded] water escapes and damages another. The effect of this doctrine is
everywhere conceded to make every person who brings a foreign substance upon his
property an insurer against all damage that may result by reason of its presence on his
property.
We find the tendency among the courts in a great majority of the cases to give effect
to the rule by finding negligence in some form and putting the decision on that ground.
Others give effect by characterizing the result as a nuisance, but declaring some of the
acts appearing in such cases to be negligence. Still others give effect on the ground of
"absolute liability," or hold the party impounding the water as an "insurer." The
tendency of the courts is to avoid resting the decision upon the two latter grounds.
Id. (citation omitted).
75. See, e.g., National Steel Serv. Ctr. v. Gibbons, 319 N.W.2d 269, 273 (Iowa 1982)
("[W]e are committed to a broader application of the strict liability doctrine of Rylands v.
Fletcher than is reflected in the Restatement.").
76, RESTATEMENT (FIRST) OF TORTS (1938).
77. See, e.g., Matomco Oil Co. v. Arctic Mechanical, Inc., 796 P.2d 1336, 1341 n.12
(Alaska 1990) ("This court has stated its preference for the 'ultrahazardous activity' test of the
First Restatement over the 'abnormally dangerous' test of the Second." (citing State Farm Fire
& Cas. Co. v. Municipality of Anchorage, 788 P.2d 726,729 (Alaska 1990))).
78. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS (1977).
79. See Cropper v. Rego Distribution Ctr., Inc., 542 F. Supp. 1142, 1149 (D. Del. 1982)
("Although Rylands' doctrine of strict liability for ultrahazardous activities was slow to gain
acceptance in this country, it is now accepted in most jurisdictions."). Interestingly, the Cropper
court used the "ultra hazardous" wording of the Restatement (First) to describe the application
of the Restatement (Second)'s "abnormally dangerous" embodiment of Rylands absolute
liability. See id.
Section 519 of the Restatement (Second) provides:
(1) One who carries on an abnormally dangerous activity is subject to liability for
harm to the person, land or chattels of another resulting from the activity, although he
has exercised the utmost care to prevent the harm.
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Restatement (Second) calls for a fact-specific evaluation to determine
whether absolute liability will lie in a particular case. 80 Thus, in most
jurisdictions today, courts apply the Rylands doctrine on a case-by-
case basis. This accords with Blackburn's original "naturally there"
language, 81 and Lord Cairnes's "non-natural" land use qualification.
82
B. The Categorical Rule
The Rylands doctrine periodically has been treated by courts as a
categorical rule that applies to any impoundment of water.83 Many
states that have followed this categorical rule, however, have created
exceptions and explanations to the categorical rule, perhaps because
the imposition of liability without proof of fault is such a harsh
remedy.8 4 The process by which states have developed variations on
(2) This strict liability is limited to the kind of harm, the possibility of which makes the
activity abnormally dangerous.
RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 519. Section 520 of the Restatement (Second) provides:
In determining whether an activity is abnormally dangerous, the following factors are
to be considered:
(a) existence of a high degree of risk of some harm to the person, land or chattels of
others;
(b) likelihood that the harm that results from it will be great;
(c) inability to eliminate the risk by the exercise of reasonable care;
(d) extent to which the activity is not a matter of common usage;
(e) inappropriateness of the activity to the place where it is carried on; and
(f) extent to which its value to the community is outweighed by its dangerous
attributes.
Id. § 520.
80. See RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 520.
81. See supra note 38 and accompanying text.
82. See supra note 54 and accompanying text.
83. See KEETON ETAL., supra note 62, § 78, at 548.
84. See, e.g., City Water Power Co. v. Fergus Falls, 128 N.W. 817, 818 (Minn. 1910)
(imposing absolute liability for the failure of a reservoir, but refusing to extend the rule to
lakeside or riverside property owners who place milldams across natural water courses for the
purpose of utilizing water power).
A recurring theme in reported cases is courts' acceptance of the principle of absolute
liability for activities of heightened danger but emphatic rejection of "the Rylands rule," which
these courts define as merely pertaining to the categorical imposition of liability in situations
that involve the failure of a water impoundment facility. Thus, these courts at the same time
paradoxically reject and accept Rylands. See, e.g., Snow v. City of Columbia, 409 S.E.2d 797
(S.C. Ct. App. 1991), cited in Shockley v. Hoechst Celanese Corp., 793 F. Supp. 670, 673
(D.S.C. 1992).
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the categorical Rylands rule closely parallels courts' treatment of the
Rylands doctrine in England.
85
One interesting variation on the categorical Rylands rule has
developed in the more ard western states. While purporting to
embrace Rylands's principal of categorical liability for the
impoundment of water, these states have nonetheless been unwilling
to impose absolute liability in cases involving irrigation ditches.
86
This exception is not surprising, given the importance of agricultural
irrigation in these states 7 and provides a perfect example of how
states liberally interpret the doctrine to meet the specialized needs of
their citizenry.
C. Statutory Application of the Rylands Rule
Many jurisdictions have codified some form of Rylands absolute
liability. Louisiana, with its unique approach to the law among the
states, may very well have the most far-reaching codified liability
scheme. Article 667 of the Louisiana Civil Code 8 establishes
85. See North Little Rock Transp. Co. v. Finkbeiner, 420 S.W.2d 874, 879-81 (Ark.
1967); see also A.W.B. Simpson, Legal Liability for Bursting Reservoirs: The Historical
Context ofRylands v. Fletcher, 13 J. LEGAL STUD. 209, 251-64 (1984).
86. See, e.g., Burt v. Farmers' Coop. Irrigation Co., 168 P. 1078, 1082 (Idaho 1917). The
Burt court opined that:
Under the common law one who diverted water from its natural course did so at his
peril, and was held practically to be an insurer against damage which might result from
such action. The common law has been modified and relaxed in this and other arid
states, so that the owner of an irrigation ditch is only liable for damages occurring to
others as a result of his negligence or unskillfulness in constructing, maintaining, or
operating the ditch.
Id. (citations omitted) (citing Campbell v. Bear River Mining Co., 35 Cal. 679 (Cal. 1868);
Messenger v. Gordon, 62 P. 959 (Colo. 1959); City of Boulder v. Fowler, 18 P. 337 (Colo.
1888); Stuart V. Noble Ditch Co., 76 P. 255 (Idaho 1904); McCarty v. Boise City Canal Co., 10
P. 623 (Idaho 1886); Fleming v. Lockwood, 92 P. 962 (Mont. 1907); Howell v. Bighorn Co., 81
P. 785 (Wyo. 1905)); see also Kunz v. Utah Power & Light Co., 871 F.2d 85 (9th Cir. 1989);
Zampos v. United States Smelting, Refining and Mining Co., 206 F.2d 171 (10th Cir. 1953)
(citing Mackay v. Breeze, 269 P. 1026 (Utah 1928)); Stephenson v. Pioneer Irrigation Dist., 288
P. 421 (Idaho 1930); Arave v. Idaho Canal Co., 46 P. 1024 (Idaho 1896).
87. While these cases were decided before the Restatement (First) and Restatement
(Second) were published, it is likely that a similar result would have been reached under either
Restatement. See RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 520(f) (1977) (discussing the balance
between the utility of the impounded water and its dangers).
88. LA. Civ. CODE ANN. art. 667 (West 1980).
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Louisiana's Statutory basis for Rylands liability.89 It provides,
"Although a proprietor may do with his estate whatever he pleases,
still he can not make any work on it, which may deprive his neighbor
of the liberty of enjoying his own, or which may be the cause of any
damage to him." 90 While the Louisiana statute does not expressly
establish absolute liability, Louisiana courts have interpreted it that
way.
91
Perhaps the best known example of statutory absolute liability for
property damage is the clean-up provisions in the Comprehensive
Environmental Response, Compensation and Liability Act.92 Other
examples include Utah's Hazardous Substances Mitigation Act,
93
which establishes absolute liability for investigation and abatement
costs resulting from the release of hazardous materials, 94 and the
Wyoming Environmental Quality Act of 1973,95 which establishes
absolute liability for the discharge of pollution into state waters.96
Additionally, several states have enacted legislation based on the
Rylands categorical rule relating solely to the impoundment of
water.
9 7
89. See id. Other sections of the Louisiana Civil Code establish strict liability in other
areas of the law. See A.N. Yiannopoulos, Civil Responsibility in the Framework of Vicinage:
Articles 667-69 and 2315 of the Civil Code, 48 TUL. L. REV. 195, 223 (1974).
90. Article 667.
91. See Butler v. Baber, 529 So.2d 374 (La. 1988), cited in Perkins v. F.I.E Corp., 762
F.2d 1250, 1254, 1257 (5th Cir. 1985); Street v. Equitable Petroleum Corp., 532 So.2d 887 (La.
Ct. App. 1988); John C. Anjier, Note, Butler v. Baber Absolute Liabiltyfor Environmental
Hazards, 49 LA. L. REV. 1138 (1989).
92. 42 U.S.C. §§ 9601-9675 (1994).
93. UTAH CODE ANN. §§ 19-6-301 to -325 (1995).
94. See id. § 19-6-302.5, cited in Utah Dep't of Envtl. Quality v. Wind River Petroleum,
881 P.2d 869, 871 (Utah 1994).
95. WYO. STAT. ANN. §§ 35-11-101 to -1507 (Michie 1997).
96. See People v. Platte Pipe Line Co., 649 P.2d 208 (Wyo. 1984), cited in James E.
Ellerbe, Note, Strict Liability for Oil Spills in Wyoming, 18 LAND & WATER L. REV. 805
(1983).
97. For example, a Wyoming statute enacted in 1957 provided: "The owners of reservoirs
shall be liable for all damage arising from leakage or overflow of the waters therefrom, or by
floods caused by breaking of the embankments of such reservoir." Wyo. STAT. § 41-46 (1957)
(repealed by 1977 Wyo. Sess. Laws ch. 120, § 3). But see Wheatland Irrigation Dist. v.
McGuire, 537 P.2d 1128, 1142-43 (Wyo. 1975). In Wheatland, the Wyoming Supreme Court
determined through a somewhat circuitous route that:
In light of the entire history of the common-law rule in Wyoming as interpreted by the
opinions of this court, as well as the philosophy surrounding those opinions as they
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IV. RYLANDS EXPLORED: OREGON'S APPLICATION OF THE DOCTRINE
Oregon's application of the Rylands doctrine is in many respects
typical of the way in which other states have applied the rule.
Consequently, Oregon law accurately represents the current status of
the Rylands doctrine nationwide. For those states that have not
adopted the Rylands doctrine, or whose approach to the doctrine
substantially differs from Oregon's approach, examining Oregon's
application of the rule can provide a structured and reasonable
approach to addressing Rylands-style claims.
must be applied to the interpretation of Section 41-46, W.S. 1957, it must be
concluded as we do, that the statute was not intended to be and is not one which
imposes absolute liability.
Id. The Wyoming legislature has enacted a statute that would appear to overrule Wheatland:
Nothing in this act shall be construed to relieve an owner or owners of any reservoir,
dam or diversion system of any legal duties, obligations or liabilities incident to their
ownership or operation of or any damages resulting from the leakage or overflow of
water or for floods resulting from the failure or rupture of the fill or structure for such
works.
Wyo. STAT. ANN. § 41-3-317 (Michie 1997). However, while this provision would appear to
establish (or re-establish) the Rylands categorical rule for reservoirs in Wyoming, the Wyoming
Supreme Court has rejected this interpretation and, thus, still applies a negligence standard. See
Tillery v. West Side Canal, Inc., 719 P.2d 1384, 1386 (Wyo. 1986).
Likewise, a 1949 Kansas statute supplanted the Rylands categorical rule with a test for
negligence:
The proprietors of every canal, fountain, ditch, conduit or other works for conveying,
collecting, retaining or storing waters shall construct and always maintain in good
order and repair the dams, locks and gates, embankments, and all other appurtenances
thereof, so that the water conveyed, collected, retained or stored thereby may not flood
or damage the premises of others, or any highway, or unnecessarily run to waste, and
shall be liable for all damages resulting from their willful or negligent failure to
comply with any of the provisions of this act, or from their negligence in the
construction, maintenance or operation of any such works.
KAN. GEN. STAT., § 42-321 (1994), quoted in Garden City Co. v. Bentrup, 228 F.2d 334, 336
(10th Cir. 1955). By way of contrast, Colorado's relevant statute, COLO. REV. STAT. ANN.
§ 37-87-104 (West 1990), appears to apply Rylands style liability to reservoirs, albeit in a form
riddled with exceptions. See Barr v. Game, Fish and Parks Comm'n, 497 P.2d 340 (Colo. Ct.
App. 1972); see also Garnet Ditch & Reservoir Co. v. Sampson, 110 P.2d 79 (Colo. 1910),
cited in Wade R. Habeeb, Annotation, Applicability of Rule of Strict or Absolute Liability to
Overflow or Escape of Water Caused by Dam Failure, 51 A.L.R.3d 965, 972 (1973); Latimer
County Ditch Co. v. Zimmerman, 34 P. 111 (Colo. 1893). See generally Wade R. Habeeb,
supra, at 972.
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A. Establishment of the Rylands Doctrine in Oregon
1. The Esson Decision
Oregon's first application of the Rylands doctrine can be found in
dicta in the 1893 Oregon Supreme Court decision, Esson v. Wattier.98
In Esson, an individual who owned property adjoining the site of a
proposed dam filed suit to enjoin construction of the dam primarily
because water from the dam was likely to enter and damage his
neighboring property.99 Relying on Justice Blackburn's Rylands
opinion, the Esson court denied the plaintiff's request for injunctive
relief, holding that "[i]f a person brings or accumulates on his land
anything which, if it should escape, may cause damage to his
neighbor, he does so at his peril."100 The Esson court, however, failed
to acknowledge Blackburn's "naturally there" requirement and the
House of Lord's "natural use" limitation on Blackburn's broad
rule.'' Thus, the Esson court substantially broadened the original
scope of Rylands liability.
After affirming the general application of Rylands in Oregon, the
Esson court specifically addressed the application of the Rylands rule
to cases in which an injunction has been sought. The court announced
the following rule:
If a person, by artificial means, raises a volume of water above
98. 34 P. 756 (Or. 1893). The Esson court's application of the Rylands doctrine aligned
Oregon with a handful of jurisdictions that, after the 1889 Johnstown Flood, began establishing
absolute liability for damages caused by the escape of impounded waters. See Habeeb, supra
note 97, at 965; Glen, supra note 54, at 517.
There is a significant historical parallel between Esson and Rylands. The Oregon Supreme
Court decided Esson while the Johnstown flood was still fresh in the American public's
memory. Similarly, England suffered disastrous dam failures at the Bilberry and Bradfield
Reservoirs, two disasters that occasioned great loss of life and property, shortly before the
English courts decided Rylands. See A.W.B. Simpson, Legal Liability for Bursting Reservoirs:
The Historical Context of Rylands v. Fletcher, 13 J. LEGAL STUD. 19, 225 (1984). Thus, the
backdrop for both Esson and Rylands was a fresh memory of disaster occasioned by the
catastrophic failure of large reservoirs.
99. SeeEsson,34P. at756.
100. Esson, 34 P. at 757 (quoting Fletcher v. Rylands). The Esson court attributed this
quotation to Justice Blackburn. In fact, however, the quotation is properly attributable to Lord
Cranworth of the House of Lords, who was paraphrasing Justice Blackburn's Exchequer
Chamber opinion. See 3 L.R.-E. & I. App. 330, 340 (H.L. 1868).
101. SeeEsson, 34 P. at 757.
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its natural level, and, by percolation or by overflow, injures
neighboring lands, without license, prescription, or grant from
the proprietor, he may invoke the interposition of a court of
equity, and obtain an injunction to prevent it, when he would
sustain irreparable injury, or be compelled to bring a
multiplicity of actions to recover the damages as they
accrued.
02
Finding that the plaintiff had not sufficiently shown that his property
would be damaged by the new dam, the court held in favor of the
defendant.'0 3
2. The Mallet Decision
Two decades later, in Mallett v. Taylor,104 the Oregon Supreme
Court affirmed in dicta the broad Esson version of the Rylands rule.
Mallett involved the escape of water from an irrigation ditch through
percolation. 10 5 In afffiring the application of absolute liability in
cases involving the escape of water from a ditch or dam, the court
followed the rule established by Justice Blackburn and followed by
both the House of Lords in Fletcher and the Oregon Supreme Court
in Esson.1' 6 However, the Mallett court found that "[i]n the instant
case there is no need to invoke in all its severity the rule laid down in
Esson v. Wattier"07 because the defendant had been negligent, thus
allowing the plaintiff to prevail on a negligence claim.10 8 Thus, the
Oregon Supreme Court recognized that in situations involving the
escape of water from either dams or irrigation ditches, liability could
be established without any inquiry into the naturalness of the activity.
In effect, the Mallet court's application of the Rylands doctrine
imposed absolute liability in all cases involving the escape of
impounded water, regardless of the nature of the water source.
102. Id.
103. See id. at 758.
104. 152 P. 873 (Or. 1915).
105. See id.
106. See supra notes 53, 100 and accompanying text.
107. Mallett, 152 P. at 875.
108. See id.
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B. The Distinction Between Reservoirs and Ditches
In 1917, the Oregon Supreme Court decided Taylor v. Farmers'
Irrigation Co.,1°9 in which a property owner sought injunctive relief
against the incursion of water onto his property caused by his
neighbor's allegedly negligent construction of a ditch." 0 After
finding that the plaintiff had not been injured by the defendant and
the defendant had not been negligent, the court denied injunctive
relief.' 11 The court stated that "the owner of a ditch is not liable per
se for leakage from his ditch, without negligence upon his part."" 
12
This was a clear departure from the absolute liability rule that the
Oregon Supreme Court had applied to dams and reservoirs.
1 13
However, it appears that Taylor's inclusion of a negligence
requirement was restricted to the escape of water from a ditch.
Oregon courts confirmed this apparent distinction between reservoirs
and ditches in later cases.
Oregon's next opportunity to address the Rylands doctrine came
twenty years later in Patterson v. Horsefly Irrigation District."14 Like
Taylor, Patterson concerned water that had leaked from a ditch." 5 In
Patterson, the defendant appealed the trial court's use of jury
instructions that closely resembled the Mallet court's wording of the
Rylands rule." 6 The Patterson court acknowledged the precedential
value of the Mallet decision, but applied the Taylor court's
negligence modification' 17 According to the Patterson court:
[T]he strict rule of liability, as laid down in the cases of dams
and reservoirs... is not usually applied to ditches and canals,
where the water is under no, or comparatively little, pressure.
109. 162 P. 973 (Or. 1917).
110. See id.
111. Seeid. at 974.
112. Id.
113. See, e.g., Esson v. Wattier, 34 P. 756 (Or. 1893).
114. 69 P.2d 283 (Or. 1937).
115. Seeki.
116. See ieL at 290. The section of the jury instructions at issue read: "I instruct you where
a person by artificial means causes water to percolate through the soil to the injury of his
neighbor [he] does so at his peril and is legally responsible therefor irrespective of negligence."
Id. (brackets in original).
117. Seeid.at291.
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The carrying of water through ditches and canals is not a
dangerous or menacing undertaking, and, by the exercise of
ordinary or reasonable care, it can be rendered comparatively
harmless.... In other words, the owners of an irrigation canal
or ditch are not liable as insurers, for injuries sustained to
adjoining property by seepage, leakage, or overflow from the
canal or ditch, but are only liable for such injuries in case of
actual negligence." 8
The Patterson court distinguished ditches from dams and
reservoirs because ditches, unlike reservoirs, do not typically
overflow without negligence. In addition, the Patterson court noted
that the escape of water from a ditch "is liable to do little injury, as
compared with that when the escape is from a reservoir."' 19 Thus, the
Patterson court justified on solid policy grounds Taylor's distinction
between dams and reservoirs on the one hand, and ditches and canals
on the other.
The Oregon Supreme Court faced yet another question regarding
liability for the escape of water from a ditch in Kaylor v. Recla.
120
The Kaylor court, which relied upon its previous decisions in Mallet
and Patterson, declared that, according to Oregon jurisprudence, "[I]f
a person, by artificial means, raises a volume of water above its
natural level, and, by percolation and by overflow, injures
neighboring lands... when the same can be prevented by reasonable
and not too expensive means, the [person] is liable for injury done to
adjoining lands .... " Significantly, the Kaylor court's statement of
the status of Oregon law mischaracterized Oregon jurisprudence by
asserting that, generally, Oregon courts impose absolute liability
according to whether a party has acted reasonably122 in his or her
attempts to avoid injuring neighboring property. Contrary to the
Kaylor court's statement of Oregon law, Oregon courts consistently
have held that, with respect to dams and reservoirs, the Rylands
118. Id. at 290-91 (quoting 3 KINNEY ON IRRIGATION AND WATER RIGHTS 672 (2d ed.
1912).
119. Id.
120. 84 P.2d 495 (Or. 1938).
121. Id. at 496-97 (emphasis added).
122. See id.
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doctrine imposes strict liability without regard to whether a party has
acted reasonably. While it is possible that the Kaylor court's
statement of Oregon jurisprudence represents an attempt to integrate
the Oregon Supreme Court's holdings in Patterson and Mallet, it
makes little sense to extend the Patterson requirement of negligence
into areas that neither Patterson nor Taylor contemplated. Kaylor's
interpretation of the doctrine of liability for escaping waters has been
largely ignored in subsequent Oregon and federal court decisions and
is probably best viewed as a simple misstatement of the law.'
2 1
C. The Exception for Reservoir-Like Bodies of Water
In 1950, Judge James Alger Fee of the United States District
Court for the District of Oregon decided Ure v. United States.124 Ure
was a consolidation of two actions, both of which concerned a breach
in the North Canal of the Owyhee Reclamation Project. The North
Canal was a raised canal, 125 approximately seventy miles long, 126 that
carried 3,366 gallons of water per second. 127 In 1946, the North Canal
suffered a breach approximately fifty feet wide at a point located
thirty-six miles from the head of the canal. 128 Water drained out of
the canal through the breach and flowed onto neighboring properties
that were located a short distance from, and approximately 260 feet
below, the level of the raised canal. 129 One of the neighboring
properties was owned by the Ures, who instituted an action to recover
damages caused by the incursion of water onto their land. 130 The
Whites, who owned agricultural land some distance from the canal
breach, also instituted an action, claiming that the canal breach
123. But see Glen, supra note 54, at 523, 526 (citing Kaylor v. Recla as supporting the
proposition that "[a]ccording to the overwhelming weight of authority, liability for damage
caused by the escape of waters impounded in reservoirs or ponds... depends upon proof of
some act of negligence.").
124. 93 F. Supp. 779 (D. Or. 1950), rev'don other grounds, 225 F.2d 709 (9th Cir. 1955).
125. See d. at 785.
126. Seeid. at 781.
127. See id. at 782. This amount is equal to approximately 450 second-feet, with a weight
of approximately fourteen tons (28,080 pounds). See THE WORLD ALMANAC 559-62 (Robert
Famighetti et al. eds., Funk & Wagnalls 1995).
128. See Ure, 93 F. Supp. at 781.
129. See Ure, 225 F.2d at 710.
130. See Ure, 93 F. Supp. at 782.
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caused a lack of irrigation water for their crops.1
31
With respect to the Whites, the court held that the defendant did
not breach its duty to them and, thus, was not liable for their
damages. 32 With respect to the Ures, however, the court found that
the defendant was absolutely liable for the breach in the canal. 133
Judge Fee examined Oregon's application of the Rylands doctrine
and noted that while "there [was] probably no opinion in which the
[Oregon Supreme Court] squarely applied [Rylands],' 34 the emphatic
approval of Rylands by the Oregon Supreme Court convinced him
that "the Oregon Supreme Court, if faced with the exact facts here,
would apply the rule of absolute liability."'
135
According to Judge Fee, prior Oregon case law had dealt with
minor incursions of water from canals and had never addressed "a
major breach in the bank of a large canal.' 36 In the Ures' situation,
the "column of water was flowing for a distance of 36.15 miles down
and through the break,"' 137 and the canal represented a "highly
dangerous instrumentality" 38 capable of releasing a "devastating rush
of water."'139 This fact distinguished Ure from other Oregon cases
dealing with water escaping from ditches and canals.
Judge Fee's decision seems to have been based on the proposition
that a breach in a major canal carrying a large amount of water poses
the same type and degree of danger inherent in a breach of a dam or
reservoir. This observation is supported by Judge Fee's examination
of case law from outside of Oregon. After analyzing several such
cases involving the percolation of waters from an irrigation ditch
140
and slight overflows from a canal,' 4' Judge Fee wrote:
131. Seeid.at781.
132. Seeid. at785.
133. See id. at 792.
134. Id. at789.
135. Id. at 791. Some commentators have incorrectly construed this as a blanket statement
that effectively reinstated the Rylands rule of strict liability for the escape of water from both
reservoirs and ditches, as applied in Esson and Mallet. See CLARK, supra note 10, at 69; Brand,
supra note 54, at 35 1.
136. Ure, 93 F. Supp. at 790.
137. Id. at 782.
138. Id. at791.
139. Id. at 786.
140. See id. (citing North Sterling Irrigation Dist. v. Dickman, 149 P. 97 (Colo. 1915)).
141. See id. (citing Jacoby v. Town of Gillette, 174 P.2d 505 (Wyo. 1946), afJd, 177 P.2d
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All these must be distinguished from the violent breach of a
reservoir by this elemental force stored by the act of a party.
Where one is managing a stream of water and loses control,
whereby the element rages over the land of another, the cases
above mentioned have no applicability.
142
Judge Fee's opinion, which has been characterized as "classical,
' 143
would be of great help to the Oregon Supreme Court when, the
following year, it would attempt to clarify the application of Rylands
absolute liability in Oregon.
D. Oregon 's Current Law: The Brown Decision
In 1951, the Oregon Supreme Court, armed with Judge Fee's
clarification of Oregon law, addressed the issue of absolute liability
for escaping water in Brown v. Gessler.144 In 1947, the Gesslers
began construction of a building on their property. 45 Following the
excavation, and before the building's foundation could be laid, rain
water filled the excavation site. 46 The water flowed into the Browns'
neighboring basement through a drainage tile, damaging materials
stored in the basement. 147 The Browns filed suit, alleging that the
Gesslers were liable under the absolute liability rule of Rylands.148
Although the Oregon Supreme Court acknowledged that the
Rylands doctrine had been adopted in Oregon, the court found that
the rule was not applicable to the facts of Brown.'49 The court
distinguished the facts of Brown from the Oregon cases that had
applied the rule: "[T]he excavation here was not for the purpose of
constructing a reservoir to hold water. It was made in the ordinary
course of building construction and was temporary in character."' 50
204 (Wyo. 1947)).
142. Ure, 93 F. Supp. at 787.
143. See Union Pac. R.L. Co. v. Oregon Irrigation Dist., 253 F. Supp. 251, 258 (D. Or.
1966).
144. 230 P.2d 541 (Or. 1951).
145. See id. at 543.
146. See id. at 544.
147. See id.
148. See id. at 545.
149. See id. Instead, the court found the defendants liable on the basis of negligence.
150. Id.
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Thus, Brown reaffirmed and clarified Patterson's application of
Rylands absolute liability to reservoirs and not to ditches.1 51 It also
provided a clearer conceptual basis for Oregon's different treatment
of reservoirs and ditches. Reservoirs, unlike ditches, are not ordinary
or, in Lord Cairnes's words, "natural" uses of water; rather, they are
uses that come with an extraordinary risk of harm. Thus, a higher
level of liability should be associated with reservoirs.
When Brown is placed in the context of the other Oregon
decisions, it is clear that there are two theories under which a water
impoundment facility may be subject to the Rylands doctrine. First, if
a water impoundment facility was constructed for the purpose of
acting as a reservoir, it would be categorically subject to Rylands
absolute liability. 52 Second, even if a reservoir-like impoundment
facility was not constructed to act as a reservoir, it may still be




The Brown court first dealt with the question of whether the
defendants' excavation was for the purpose of constructing a
reservoir. According to the court, "[tihe waters collected in the
[excavation] were not brought [into the excavation] to serve any
purpose of the defendants and were perhaps as unwelcome to the
defendants as to plaintiffs."' 54 The Brown court held that the
defendants did not intend to build a reservoir but instead were taking
what was "necessarily the first step in the construction of [a]
151. See supra note 119 and accompanying text.
152. Several commentators have expressed the mistaken belief that Brown requires that a
defendant have brought water onto his property "for his own purposes." See CLARK, supra note
10, at 70. This belief may stem from the Brown court's decision to quote Justice Blackburn's
Rylands opinion: .'We think the true rule of law is, that the person who for his own purposes
brings on his lands and collects and keeps there anything likely to do mischief.., must keep it
in at his peril .... Brown, 230 P.2d at 545 (quoting Fletcher, 1 L.R.-Ex. 265 (Ex. Ch. 1866)).
In fact, however, Oregon courts have not used Blackburn's generalized "for his own purposes"
test in reported cases, either before or after Brown.
153. See Brown, 230 P.2d at 540.
154. Id. at 545.
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building." s According to the court, the Gesslers should have
anticipated that the excavation site might fill with water, and their
failure to take the necessary precautions established the basis of their
liability in negligence rather than absolute liability.1
56
2. Unreasonable Use of a Reservoir-Like Impoundment Facility
Having determined that the excavation site was not a reservoir, the
Brown court turned to the question of whether such a site could
nonetheless invoke Rylands absolute liability because of its reservoir-
like characteristics. In response to the plaintiffs' contention that the
application of Rylands does not depend on whether a defendant
excavates his property for the purpose of building a reservoir, 57 the
court admitted that "[u]nder some circumstances that might be true,
but not under the circumstances of this case."1 58 According to the
court, the circumstances under which the purpose of the excavation
would be unimportant could be determined by asking if the "act or
use [was] a reasonable exercise of the dominion which the owner of
the property has by virtue of his ownership over his property, having
regard to all interests affected, his own and those of his neighbors,
and having in view also, public policy."'159 The end result of this
analysis would yield the appropriate "degree of care . .. required
commensurate with the danger involved."'
160
Toward this end, the Brown court distinguished its holding from
the Colorado case of Canon City v. Oxtob .16 1 In Canon City, a
railroad company excavated a borrow pit 16 to obtain material to
maintain its einbankments and roadbed.' 63 The pit soon filled with




158. Id. at 546.
159. Id. at 547 (citing 1 AM. JUR. Adjoining Landowners § 3 (1936)).
160. Id
161. 100 P. 1127, 1128 (Colo. 1908), cited in Brown, 230 P.2d at 546.
162. A "borrow pit" is a pit from which earth is taken for use in filling or embanking. See
WEBSTERS THIRD NEW INTERNATIONAL DICTIONARY OF THE ENGLISH LANGUAGE 257 (3d ed.
1993).
163. See Canon City, 100 P. at 1127.
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surface area that was slightly larger than an acre. 164 The water sat in
the borrow pit for a prolonged period of time, after which it began to
damage a neighboring property through percolation. 165 The Colorado
Supreme Court held the railroad liable for the damage caused by the
escaping water.
16
The Brown court explained that, unlike the Gesslers' excavation,
"a 'borrow pit' is a more or less permanent excavation and, in effect,
a reservoir, though not such for any use or purpose of the owner."'
67
The Brown court further explained that while the Gesslers'
excavation was a "reasonable" use of the property,'168 "retaining ...
water in the 'borrow pit' involved an extraordinary and unusual
danger to the adjoining landowner."'169 Thus, the Brown court
recognized Ure's extension of absolute liability to activities that
produce the same effects as reservoirs, but limited that extension to
those circumstances that present extraordinary and unusual danger.
E. Subsequent Cases and the Expansion of the Rylands Doctrine
Beyond Water-Related Liability
Since the Oregon Supreme Court decided Brown, the list of
reservoir-like activities to which the Rylands doctrine applies has
branched out into activities that are not associated with water. Oregon
courts have increasingly applied the Rylands doctrine to other "ultra
hazardous"'' 7 0 or "abnormally dangerous '' 17' activities, such as the
164. See id. At various times during the year, the pond held up to 2,618,350 gallons of
water, with a weight of 10,930 tons. See id.
165. See Canon City, 100P. at 1128.
166. See id. Though a Colorado case, Canon City is nevertheless applicable to a discussion
of Oregon law because the Canon City court asserted that it decided the case in accord with the
common law of England, see id., and Oregon courts' application of absolute liability
consistently has followed the common law of England.
167. Brown, 230 P.2d at 546 (emphasis added).
168. See id. at 545.
169. Id. at 546. In contrasting the borrow pit and the Gesslers' excavation, the Brown court
focused on the fact that the construction of a building on the Gesslers' property, including the
necessary act of digging a temporary excavation for the foundation, was a "reasonable exercise
of the dominion which [the] defendants had over their own property," id. at 547, while the
borrow pit involved extraordinary and unusual danger. See id. '
170. "Ultra hazardous" is the terminology used in the Restatement (First) of Torts. See
RESTATEMENT OF TORTS § 520,41 (1938).
171. "Abnormally dangerous" is the terminology used in the Restatement (Second) of
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storage of natural gas, 172 blasting,173 and crop dusting.174 Currently,
the most widely accepted wording of the rule of absolute liability in
Oregon can be found in McLane v. Northwest Natural Gas
Company. 75  According to McLane, an activity is abnormally
dangerous and, thus, subject to Rylands absolute liability when it is
"extraordinary, exceptional, or unusual, considering the locality in
which it is carried on; when there is a risk of grave harm from such
abnormality; and when the risk cannot be eliminated by the exercise
of reasonable care.' 76 While the exact application of this formula
often differs between Oregon courts, 177 the law, in general, is fairly
well settled.
7 1
The Oregon Supreme Court recently has shown a willingness to
apply the McLane formulation of "abnormally dangerous activities"
to irrigation ditches, despite earlier decisions, such as Patterson, that
would seem to preclude such an application. In Reter v. Talent
Irrigation District,7 9 the Oregon Supreme Court examined the
possibility of applying Rylands absolute liability to a claim for
damage to an orchard caused by seepage from a small irrigation ditch
Torts. See RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 520,36 (1977).
172. See, e.g., McLane v. Northwest Natural Gas Co., 467 P.2d 635 (Or. 1970).
173. See, e.g., Bedell v. Goulter, 261 P.2d 842 (Or. 1953).
174. See, e.g., Loe v. Lenhardt, 362 P.2d 312 (Or. 1961).
175. 476 P.2d 633 (Or. 1970).
176. Id. at 637. The formulation is essentially that of the Restatement (Second) of Torts
without part (f):
In determining whether an activity is abnormally dangerous, the following factors are
to be considered:
(a) existence of a high degree of risk of some harm to the person, land or chattels of
others;
(b) likelihood that the harm that results from it will be great;
(c) inability to eliminate the risk by the exercise of reasonable care;
(d) extent to which the activity is not a matter of common usage;
(e) inappropriateness of the activity to the place where it is carried on; and
(f) extent to which its value to the community is outweighed by its dangerous
attributes.
RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 520.
177. See, e.g., Koos v. Roth, 652 P.2d 1255, 1258-61 (Or. 1982).
178. See, e.g., James 0. Garrett, H OREGON STATE BAR REAL PROPERTY CLE § 52.30, at
52-2 1.
179. 482 P.2d 170 (Or. 1971).
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carrying a "non-reservoir-like" flow of water.180 The court, after first
quoting with approval McLane's definition of "abnormally
dangerous," stated that:
The activity conducted by defendant here-the irrigation of
orchard land in a naturally dry area--can hardly be called
"exceptional, or unusual, considering the locality in which it is
caried on." Moreover, the risk of serious harm created by the
activity is minimal. The canals involved in this case are
approximately 18 inches deep and four feet wide. They do not
appear to create the risk of serious harm which courts have had
in mind in imposing strict liability.1
8 1
Thus, while the Reter court found that imposing absolute liability was
inappropriate under the facts of Reter, the court's willingness even to
apply the McLane formula to irrigation ditches represents a
significant departure from Oregon's Rylands jurisprudence.
V. CONCLUSION
The Oregon case law dealing with Rylands absolute liability has
followed a consistent path. Esson and Mallett initially recognized the
need for a non-traditional basis of liability for the escape of restrained
waters. In doing so, Oregon became one of the first states to
recognize that certain activities are so dangerous that a party
conducting those activities should act as an insurer for neighbors.
Subsequent Oregon case law clarified the doctrine of absolute
liability on practical and public policy grounds. Eventually, Oregon
courts developed a two-prong test for the application of Rylands:
structures constructed for the purpose of acting as a reservoir are
categorically subject to absolute liability, whereas structures that
were not built to serve as reservoirs are subject to a case-by-case
analysis to determine whether absolute liability should be imposed.
While this case-by-case analysis of non-reservoir structures first
hinged on the distinction between "reasonable" uses of property and
those uses that carry with them the same sort of danger that is
180. See id. at 173.
181. Id.
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associated with reservoirs, subsequent case law has expanded this
distinction to one between reasonable uses of property and
"abnormally dangerous" uses of property.
Oregon's application of the Rylands doctrine exemplifies the
doctrine's status throughout much of the United States. While most
states have adopted the Rylands doctrine either in whole or in part,
not all states have had the opportunity to develop and test the doctrine
to the same degree as has Oregon. Thus, Oregon's refined application
of the doctrine may serve well as a prototype for those states whose
own version of the doctrine is not so well defined.
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